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Azham Md. Ali
This paper reports the findings of a questionnaire survey of
“knowledge gap” and “deficient performance gap” conducted in
Malaysia on auditors and corporate managers. A total of 47 auditors
and 72 corporate managers in Klang Valley responded to the survey.
The aims of the study are two folds. Firstly, it ascertains the
knowledge of the auditors and corporate managers of the auditors’
duties as required by the Malaysian Companies Act 1965 and the
Malaysian Approved Standards on Auditing. Secondly, it elicits the
perceived performance of auditors in relation to these required
duties. The results of the study indicate the existence of “knowledge
gap” and “deficient performance gap” between auditors and corpo-
rate managers. Overall, the results indicate that: (1) the auditors in
Malaysia are knowledgeable about their duties and (2) the corpo-
rate managers have limited knowledge of auditors’ duties and they
are less satisfied with some of the duties performed by the auditors.
Keywords: audit expectation gap; deficient performance gap; knowledge gap;
Malaysia
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Introduction
The modern industrial economies
are based on capitalism, a system of
economy designed to allocate resources
using market mechanisms. To ensure
efficient allocation of resources in capi-
talist economy, credible information
about the companies’ operation should
be made available for decision making
process (Koo and Sim 1999).  Such
information can be obtained through
the financial statements. Auditors em-
ployed by companies to audit the fi-
nancial statements are therefore play-
ing an important role in lending cred-
ibility to the information. This cred-
ibility is however called into question
after some spectacular and well-publi-
cized corporations (e.g. Enron and
WorldCom in USA) collapsed shortly
after an unqualified (i.e. clean) audit
report was issued. The collapses of
these companies have led to signifi-
cant increases in criticism and litiga-
tion against the auditing profession.
This current situation concurs with the
view of Russell (1986) that the audit-
ing profession throughout the world is
facing a liability and credibility crisis.
The auditing profession in Ma-
laysia, like in other countries, has also
been involuntarily placed in a spot-
light particularly when one of the listed
companies, Technology Resources In-
dustries Bhd. (TRI), was discovered to
have issued fictitious invoices totaling
nearly RM260 million in 1998 and
1999. The auditors of TRI, Arthur
Andersen & Co, failed to detect and
report the fraudulent transactions and
did not qualify the financial statements
of TRI for these two years (The Malay
Mail 13 Sept. 2002). Lim (1993) as-
serts that the blame should not be placed
on the auditors’ shoulders alone as the
nature and objectives of auditing are
perceived differently by different par-
ties. In line with Lim, Woolf (1985, p.
18) believes that “[auditors] as a breed
has not become more negligent. The
real problem is related to the palpable
gap between our own perception
of…auditing…and that of the public
whom we serve.”
The “gap” mentioned by Woolf is
known in the auditing literature as the
“audit expectation gap.” The term “au-
dit expectation gap” was first intro-
duced to audit literature by Liggio
(1974). He defined the audit expecta-
tion gap as the difference between the
levels of expected performance as en-
visioned by both the user of a financial
statement and the independent accoun-
tant. Cohen Commission (1978) ex-
tended Liggio’s definition by taking
into account whether a gap may exist
between what the public expects or
needs and what auditors can and should
reasonably expect to accomplish.
Porter (1993, pp. 49-50), in “The
Audit Expectation–Performance Gap,”
has structured the audit expectation
gap in a much more extensive way.
She asserts that the audit expectation
gap should consist of different compo-
nents. Such an approach of identifying
the different components allowed the
audit expectation gap to be analyzed in
a more detailed manner. Hence, more
effective solutions can be sought to
close the different components of the
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gap to improve the perceived qualities
of an audit. She defined the audit ex-
pectation gap as “the gap between
society’s expectations of auditors and
auditors’ performance, as perceived
by society.”  It comprises of two com-
ponents:
? Reasonable gap –the difference be-
tween “what the public expects au-
ditors to achieve and what they can
reasonably be expected to accom-
plish”; and
? Performance gap –the difference
between “what the public can rea-
sonably expect auditors to accom-
plish and what auditors are per-
ceived to achieve.”
The performance gap is further
subdivided into:
? Deficient standards –the gap be-
tween “what can reasonably be ex-
pected of auditors and auditors’ ex-
isting duties as defined by the law
and professional promulgation.”
? Deficient performance –the gap be-
tween “the expected standard of
performance of auditors’ existing
duties and auditors’ perceived per-
formance, as expected and perceived
by the public.”
The audit expectation gap is detri-
mental to the financial reporting and
auditing process, as the public may
perceive the work performed by exter-
nal auditors as unsatisfactory. There-
fore, the audit expectation gap is cru-
cial to the audit profession as they
determine the value of auditing and the
reputation of auditors in modern soci-
ety (Wa and Selva 1993). Despite the
importance of the audit expectation
gap to the auditing profession, not
many studies have been conducted to
address this issue in Malaysia. At this
point, the only published audit expec-
tation gap study in Malaysia is Fadzly
and Ahmad (2004). The substantial
research findings (e.g. Lee 1970; 1983;
Humphrey 1993; Esptein and Geiger
1994) may not be applicable in devel-
oping countries like Malaysia as these
studies have provided findings on the
audit expectation gap in the developed
and Western countries such as the
United States of America, United King-
dom, Australia and New Zealand.
Therefore, their findings may be partly
(or even wholly) affected by economic,
social or legal factors unique to those
countries in which the studies took
place (Arrigton et al. 1983).
To complement the study of
Fadzly and Ahmad (2004), a survey is
conducted with 100 auditors and 100
corporate managers in Malaysia. The
objective of the current study is to
ascertain whether a “knowledge gap”1
exists between the auditors and man-
agers on the existing duties of audi-
tors. In addition, the study aims to
examine whether a “deficient perfor-
mance gap,”2 a component of audit ex-
?
1 Knowledge gap – the gap between the knowledge levels of auditors as compared to corporate
managers on duties of auditors.
2 Deficient performance – the gap between the expected standard of performance of auditors’
existing duties and auditors’ perceived performance, as expected and perceived by the corporate
managers.
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pectation gap in the Porter’s model,
exists between the auditors and man-
agers in Malaysia. It is hoped that the
empirical evidence collected in the
study will contribute a new insight into
the audit expectation gap and enable
future steps to be conducted  to narrow
the gap in a more comprehensive and
rational basis.
The remainder of this paper is
organized into four major sections.
The first section summarizes the lit-
erature on audit expectation gap. The
second section discusses the research
methodology. The third section pre-
sents the results and implications. Fi-
nally, the concluding section summa-
rizes the findings, highlights the limi-
tation of the study and suggests direc-
tions for future research.
The Local Auditing Context in
Malaysia
The Companies Commission of
Malaysia regulates all companies
which include public listed and private
limited companies incorporated under
the Malaysian Companies Act 1965
(MCA 1965). Section 169 (4) of the
Companies Act 1965 requires every
company incorporated under the Act
to have its financial statements to be
audited before they are presented at
the annual general meeting. Section 9
of the Act further requires that the
audit must be performed by an ap-
proved company auditor as defined
under Section 8 of the Act. The Malay-
sian auditors are required to follow the
Malaysian Approved Standards on
Auditing (MASA) in the conduct of
their audits. Any breach of or failure to
comply with MASA could be consid-
ered as conduct discreditable to the
profession, hence this could lead to
disciplinary action against the audi-
tors (Arens et al. 2003).
Prior Studies on Audit
Expectation Gap
The audit expectation gap research
literature is extensive. A significant
number of studies have been conducted
in many countries to investigate the
nature and the extent of an audit ex-
pectation gap through the use of ques-
tionnaire survey. The aims for con-
ducting these studies are to elicit the
actual and the perceived roles and re-
sponsibilities of auditors and to iden-
tify the contributing factors of the ex-
pectation gap (Koh and Woo 1998).
Wa and Selva (1993) conducted a
questionnaire survey to investigate the
auditees’ perceptions of their external
auditors in Hong Kong. The research
finds significant differences in expec-
tation with regard to auditors’ duties
and responsibilities between auditors
and auditees in Hong Kong. The study
indicates that the auditees believe that
the auditors are the best people to
detect fraud and irregularities, despite
the fact that auditees have been explic-
itly informed in the engagement letter,
that the duty for the detection of fraud
and irregularities rest with the man-
agement. This study also shows that an
unqualified report has been perceived
quite differently between the auditees
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and the auditors. This difference in
perception of an unqualified audit re-
port suggests that auditees do not un-
derstand the role of audit and work
performed by auditors. For example,
unqualified report implies the absence
of fraud and error, future viability of
the company, and efficiency and ef-
fectiveness of the management.
Porter (1993) study finds that 50
percent of the audit expectation gap in
New Zealand is due to deficient stan-
dards, 34 percent is caused by society
holding unreasonable expectations of
auditors, and 16 percent is from per-
ceived sub-standard performance by
auditors. Humphrey et al. (1993) con-
firm the existence of an audit expecta-
tion gap in the UK. The critical com-
ponents of the expectation gap include:
i) the auditor’s role with respect to
fraud detection; ii) the auditor’s re-
sponsibility to third parties; iii) the
issues in balance sheet valuation; iv)
the threats of auditors’ independence,
and; iv) the conduct of audit work in
relation to the auditors’ ability to cope
with risk and uncertainty.
Low et al. (1988) conducted a
survey to examine the perception of
the auditors and financial analysts on
the objectives of company audit in
Singapore. The research reveals that
there is an expectation gap between
the auditors and financial analysts in
the following areas: i) prevention of
fraud, ii) guarantee of the accuracy of
financial information, and iii) effec-
tiveness in utilizing the government
grants and levies. A later study con-
ducted by Best et al. (2001) in
Singapore finds that an audit expecta-
tion gap mainly exists in: i) the auditor’s
responsibilities for the detection and
prevention of fraud, ii) the auditor’s
responsibilities in maintaining the ac-
counting records and their judgment in
the selection of auditing procedures.
Epstein and Geiger (1994) con-
ducted a survey on various financial
reporting issues among investors. The
survey finds that: i) an expectation gap
exists between auditors and investors
on the level of assurance an audit pro-
vides, and ii) investors seek very high
levels of financial statement assurance.
Consistent with Epstein and Geiger’s
findings, McEnroe and Martens (2001)
survey on individual investors also
finds that investors have higher expec-
tation in relation to: i) fraud and errors,
ii) the effectiveness of internal control
of the company, iii) disclosure in the
accounting reports, and iv) illegal op-
erations in the company.
At this point, the only published
audit expectation gap study in Malay-
sia is Fadzly and Ahmad (2004). Based
on the survey instrument of Best et al.
(2001) and Schelluch (1996), this study
examines the audit expectation gap in
Malaysia among auditors and major
users of financial statements: bankers,
investors, and stockbrokers. The study
focuses on the positive view of the
expectation gap, which compares au-
ditors’ and users’ perceptions on the
duties of auditors. The study reveals
that audit expectation gap exists in
Malaysia, particularly on issues con-
cerning auditor’s responsibility. A
wide gap found is regarding the
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auditor’s responsibilities in fraud de-
tection and prevention, preparation of
financial statements and accounting
records, and internal control. Overall,
the findings in Malaysia are consistent
with the previous study of Best et al.
(2001) and Schelluch (1996).
The current study aims to comple-
ment the study of Fadzly and Ahmad
(2004) on audit expectation gap in
Malaysia by examining whether there
is a “knowledge gap” and “deficient
performance gap.” The investigation
of “knowledge gap” is important to
complement the findings of audit ex-
pectation gap in Malaysia because re-
search (e.g. Bailey et al. 1983; Epstein
and Geiger 1994; Monroe and Woodliff
1993) find that the knowledge of users
influence the size of the expectation
gap. Such findings is also consistent
with the assertion that expectations
are derived from perceptions, which
can be thought of the cognitive process
by which individual give meaning to
the environment (Ivancevich and
Matteson 1987). Many factors can af-
fect perception, for example knowl-
edge gained from past experience and
education, working experience and
management position in the organiza-
tion (Dearborn and Simmon 1958).
Therefore, in order to have a compre-
hensive understanding of the exist-
ence of the audit expectation gap in
Malaysia, the “knowledge gap” needs
to be examined. Based on the model of
Porter (1993), the “deficient perfor-
mance gap,” a component of audit
expectation gap is also examined in
this study. The “deficient performance
gap” is examined because it reveals
the level of satisfaction on work per-
formed by the auditors. Such informa-
tion will be very useful to the auditing
profession as it enables the audit pro-
fession to improve on the areas that are
perceived to be underperformed.
Research Methodology and
Design
A survey is conducted in Klang
Valley among the auditors and corpo-
rate managers to investigate the exist-
ence of the “knowledge gap” and the
“deficient performance gap.” The fol-
lowing hypotheses are tested:
The knowledge gap
H0: There is no association between
auditors’ and corporate manag-
ers’ knowledge on the existing
duties of auditors
H1: There is an association between
auditors’ and corporate manag-
ers’ knowledge on the existing
duties of auditors
The deficient performance gap
H0: There is no association between
auditors’ and corporate manag-
ers’ perception on the quality of
the performance of the auditors.
H1: There is an association between
auditors’ and corporate manag-
ers’ in perception on the quality
of the performance of the audi-
tors.
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Sample Selection
Using convenience sampling
methodology, 200 questionnaires were
handed to auditors and corporate man-
agers in Malaysia. The corporate man-
agers are used in the study because
based on agency theory, the corporate
managers are acting as an agent to
manage the funds entrusted by the
principals, and the auditors are em-
ployed to monitor the information pro-
vided by the managers to the princi-
pals (Fama and Jensen 1983). As such,
the corporate managers are playing a
significant role in the financial report-
ing system. In addition, not many re-
search of audit expectation gap fo-
cused on corporate managers, there-
fore it is hoped that the findings from
this study can contribute to the exist-
ing audit expectation gap literature.
Survey Instruments
The questionnaire in this study
covers 26 items related to the legal
requirements of auditors in Malaysia
(section 174 of Malaysian Company
Act 1965), the Malaysian Approved
Standards on Auditing (MASA) and
the duties of auditors suggested in the
study of Porter (1993) which focused
on the following roles: i) auditors as
guarantors of the accuracy of a
company’s financial statements and/
or its solvency, ii) auditors giving early
warning of company failure, iii) audi-
tors detecting fraud and reporting it to
shareholders, iv) auditors discovering
and disclosing illegals, and v) auditors
reporting matters of concern to regula-
tory authorities.
Section (A) of the questionnaire
is used to gather personal information
from the respondents for demographic
analysis, and Section (B) is used to
investigate the “knowledge gap” and
the “deficient performance gap” on
the duties of the auditors. The ques-
tions in Section (B) comprise of two
parts. The respondents will be asked to
answer “Yes,” “Uncertain” or “No”
on the questions whether the duties are
existing duty of an auditor. The objec-
tive is to test whether there is a “knowl-
edge gap” between the auditors and
corporate managers. If the respondents
choose “Yes,” the respondents are re-
quired to choose from a scale of 1
(poorly) to 5 (excellent) to indicate
how well the auditors have the per-
formed the duties. This is to determine
the “deficient performance gap” be-
tween the auditors and corporate man-
agers.
Statistical methods
To analyze the “knowledge gap”
between auditors and corporate man-
agers, the descriptive analysis, cross-
tabulation analysis, chi-square test and
t-test are applied. The respondents are
required to answer “Yes,” “Uncertain”
or “No” on the questions whether each
of the duties stated is an existing duty
of an auditor. The answer for “Yes” is
coded as “+1,” the answer for “Uncer-
tain” is coded as “0,” and “No” is
coded as “-1.” The “knowledge gap’ is
summarized using mean, standard de-
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viation and cross-tabulation on each of
the questions asked. The hypothesis is
analyzed using the chi-square on each
of the questions asked and t-test is
used to determine the overall exist-
ence of “knowledge gap.”
To test the second hypothesis on
“deficient performance gap” between
the auditors and managers; descriptive
analysis, Mann-Whitney test and t-test
are used. The respondents will rate the
performance of the auditor from a scale
of 1 (poor) to 5 (excellent) for each
duty stated if the respondents believed
that the duty is an existing duty of the
auditor. However, the analysis of the
performance of the auditors will be
based only on the actual existing du-
ties required by the Malaysian Com-
pany Act 1965 and Malaysian Ap-
proved Standards on Auditing
(MASA). The responses for non-ex-
isting duties of the auditors will be
ignored because the duties are not re-
quired by the Company Act and Audit-
ing Standards. Thus, only the mean
and standard deviation of the responses
on the actual existing duties will be
tabulated. The hypothesis is analyzed
using the Mann-Whitney Test and the
overall existence of the “deficient per-
formance gap” will be tested using the
t-test on the existing duties of auditors.
Findings and Discussions
Demographic of Respondent
Groups
The survey questionnaires were
handed to 100 auditors and 100 corpo-
rate managers. Response rate from the
two groups and other demographic
details are shown in Table 1 and Table
2. The results from Table 1 indicate
that an overall response rate of 59.5
percent is a creditable result for this
type of data collection method. Table
1 shows that 95.8 percent of the corpo-
rate managers do not have qualifica-
tion and working experience in rela-
tion to accounting and auditing. How-
ever, 66.7 percent of the corporate
managers have more than 10 years of
working experience in the current po-
sition. On the other hand, 46.8 percent
of the auditors are in the current posi-
tion for more than 10 years and all the
auditors have an accounting qualifica-
tion. Thus, a fair understanding on the
Table 1. Demographic of Respondents
Subject No of Responses Auditing Accounting
Group survey sent received experience qualifications
n % Yes No Yes No
Auditors 100 47 47 47 - 47 -
Corporate managers 100 72 72 3 69 3 69
Total 200 119 59.5 50 69 50 69
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work performed by the auditors could
be expected from both types of respon-
dents.
Knowledge Gap Analysis
Included in the 26 duties asked in
the questionnaire, only 7 of the duties
are required by the MASA and MCA
(1965). These are shown in Table 3,
together with the means and standard
deviation of the responses for both
respondent groups. The analysis of
Table 3 suggests that overall both re-
spondent groups recognize the exist-
ing duties of auditors required by the
MASA and MCA (1965). However,
the smaller absolute values of the means
responses from the corporate manag-
ers indicate that, in general, the corpo-
rate managers are less accurate than
the auditors in recognizing the exist-
ing duties of auditors.
The mean value of “1” from the
responses of the auditors in relation to
Q3, Q6, Q8, and Q17 in Table 3 im-
plies that all auditors recognize these
as the existing duties of auditors. How-
ever the value of mean for Q13, Q14
and Q21 is less than “1.” This suggests
that some of the auditors fail to recog-
nize these as the existing duties of
auditors. The cross tabulation analysis
in Table 5 indicates that one of the
auditors fail to recognize Q13 and Q21
as an existing duty of auditors and two
auditors fail to recognize for Q13.
Overall, the number of auditors that
fail to recognize the existing duties of
auditors is relatively small and this
indicates that the Malaysian auditors
are generally knowledgeable with re-
gard to their existing duties.
The analysis of Table 4 indicates
that overall, the auditors manage to
recognize all of the 19 duties that are
not required by the MASA and MCA
(1965). However, a small number of
auditors, as indicated by mean less
than “-1” in Table 4, fail to recognize
that Q5, Q7, Q9, Q10, Q11, Q12, Q15,
Q18, Q19, Q22, Q23, Q24 and Q25 are
the non-existing duties of auditors.
Based on the results indicated in Table
4, it reveals that some auditors are
confused particularly on their duties to
report to the regulatory authority.  The
Table 2. Occupational Experience of Respondents
Working Experience Total
1-5 years 6-10 years 11-15 years >15 years
Manager 8 16 27 21 72
11.1% 22.2% 37.5% 29.2% 100.0%
Auditor 12 13 11 11 47
25.5% 27.7% 23.4% 23.4% 100.0%
Total 20 29 38 32 119
16.8% 24.4% 31.9% 26.9% 100.0%
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Table 3. The Mean and Standard Deviation Values of Respondents on
Existing Duties of Auditors
Position of the Respondents
Manager, N=72 Auditor, N=47
Mean Std. Mean Std.
Deviation Deviation
Q3. State whether financial
statements fairly reflect 1.00 .000 1.00 .000
the company’s affairs
Q6. Express doubts in the
audit report about the  .92 .325 1.00 .000
company’s continued existence
Q8.Detect deliberate distortion .78 .481 1.00 .000
of financial information
Q13. Disclose in the audit report
misappropriation of company assets .71 .568 .94 .323
by company directors/senior
management
Q14. Disclose in the audit report
deliberate distortion of financial .76 .489 .91 .408
statements
Q17. Disclose in the audit report
illegal acts which directly affect .83 .475 1.00 .000
the company’s accounts
Q21. Examine the company’s .35 .675 .91 .351
internal control
MASA on fraud and error, AI700 Para
24, states that auditors should main-
tain confidentiality on irregularities
found to a third party unless the duty is
overridden by statute, law or by courts
of law. It is stipulated in the MCA
(1965) that the auditors should report
to the Registrar on any breach or non-
observance of any provision of the
MCA (1965) unless they are unable to
deal adequately by commenting in the
audit report or bring the matter to the
notice of the directors [MCA
174(8)(b)]. Therefore based on MASA
and MCA (1965), it is generally be-
lieved that auditors have no specific
legal responsibility to report breach or
non-observance insofar as they believe
the matter could be resolved through
the ways specified in section 178(8)(b).
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Table 4. The Mean and Standard Deviation Values of Respondents Non-
Existing Duties of Auditors
Position of the Respondents
Manager, N=72 Auditor, N=47
Mean Std. Mean Std.
Deviation Deviation
Q1. Prepare the auditee company’s -1.00 0.000 -1.00 0.000
 financial statements
Q2. Guarantee audited financial 0.17 0.839 -1.00 0.000
statements are accurate
Q4. Guarantee the auditee 0.50 0.751 -1.00 0.000
company is solvent
Q5. Report privately to a
regulatory authority doubts about 0.69 0.620 -0.98 0.146
the company’s continued existence
Q7. Report breaches of tax laws to the IRB 0.46 0.691 -0.96
0.204
Q9. Report privately to a regulatory
authority theft of corporate assets 0.00 0.671 -0.98 0.143
by non-managerial employees
Q10. Report to a regulatory authority
on misappropriation of company assets 0.62 0.542 -0.96 0.204
by company director/senior management
Q11. Report privately to a regulatory
authority on deliberate distortion of 0.57 0.668 -0.96 0.204
financial statements
Q12. Disclose in the audit report theft
of corporate assets by non-managerial 0.21 0.821 -1.00 0.000
Q15. Report privately to a regulatory 0.64 0.589 -0.72 0.498
authority suspicions of fraud
Q16. Detect illegal acts by company
officials which do not directly affect 0.08 0.884 -1.00 0.000
the company’s accounts
Q18. Disclose in the audit report
illegal acts which do not directly affect -0.29 0.777 -0.96 0.292
the company’s accounts
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In view of the complication in MASA
and MCA (1965) in relation to the
controversial issue of reporting irregu-
larities to regulatory party, some con-
fusion among auditors could be ex-
pected.
The corporate managers fail to
recognize 13 out of the 19 non-exist-
ing duties of the auditors.  They are
stated in Q2, Q4, Q5, Q7, Q10, Q11,
Q12, Q15, Q16, Q19, Q20 and Q22 in
Table 4 The value of mean is “0” in Q9
because 16 corporate managers have
answered “yes,” 40 have answered
“uncertain” and 16 have answered
“no.” This is shown in the cross tabu-
lation analysis in Table 5. Overall, the
corporate managers recognize the ex-
isting duties of auditors but they fail to
recognize duties that are not required
by MCA (1965) and MASA. The re-
sults imply that the corporate manag-
ers have limited knowledge about the
actual duties of auditors. As a conse-
Continued from Table 4
Position of the Respondents
Manager, N=72 Auditor, N=47
Mean Std. Mean Std.
Deviation Deviation
Q18. Disclose in the audit report
illegal acts which do not directly affect -0.29 0.777 -0.96 0.292
the company’s accounts
Q19. Report privately to a regulatory
authority illegal acts uncovered in the 0.17 0.671 -0.91 0.351
company
Q20.Examine and report on the fairness 0.33 0.671 -1.00 0.000
of non-financial information
Q22. Examine and report on the
efficiency and effectiveness of the 0.14 0.698 -0.98 0.146
company’s management
Q23. Audit published quarterly -0.31 0.573 -0.96 0.204
company reports
Q24. Examine and report on the -0.46 0.670 -0.98 0.146
fairness of financial forecasts
Q25.Consider and report on the
company’s impact on its local -0.81 0.432 -0.96 0.204
community
Q26. Verify every transaction of -0.46 .768 -1.00 .000
the auditee company
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Table 5. The Cross Tabulation and The Chi-Square Test Statistics on Exist-
ing Duties of Auditors
Position of the Respondents
Manager, N=72 Auditor, N=47
Yes No Uncertain Yes No Uncertain
Q3. State whether financial
statements fairly reflect the 72 0 0 47 0 0 Cannot be
company’s affairs calculated
Q6. Express doubts in the
audit report about the 67 4 1 47 0 0 Not
company’s continued existence significant
Q8. Detect deliberate distortion 58 12 2 47 0 0 10.357*
of financial information
Q13. Disclose in the audit report
misappropriation of company 55 13 4 45 1 1 8.195**
assets by company directors/
senior management
Q14. Disclose in the audit report
deliberate distortion of financial 57 13 2 45 0 2 9.583*
statements
Q17. Disclose in the audit report
illegal acts which directly affect 63 6 3 47 0 0 6.356**
the company’s accounts
Q21. Examine the company’s 33 31 8 44 2 1 28.507*
internal control
* Significant at 1% significance level,
**Significance at 5% significance leve1,
*** Significant at 10% significance level
Chi-
Square
Test
Statistics
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Table 6. The Cross Tabulation and The Chi-Square Test Statistics on Non-Existing Duties of
Auditors
Position of the Respondents
Manager, N=72 Auditor, N=47
Yes No Uncertain Yes No Uncertain
Q1. Prepare the auditee 0 0 72 0 0 47 Cannot be
company’s financial calculated
statements
Q2. Guarantee audited
financial statements are 32 20 20 0 0 47 60.289*
accurate
Q4. Guarantee the auditee 47 14 11 0 0 47 81.699*
company is solvent
Q5. Report privately to a
regulatory authority doubts 56 10 6 0 1 46 92.985*
about the company’s continued
existence
Q7.Report breaches of tax laws 41 23 8 0 2 45 82.876*
to the IRB
Q9. Report privately to a
regulatory authority theft 16 40 16 0 1 46 65.542*
of corporate assets by non-
managerial employees
Q10. Report to a regulatory
authority on misappropriation 47 23 2 0 2 45 103.287*
of company assets by company
director/senior management
Q11. Report privately to a
regulatory authority on deliberate 48 17 7 0 2 45 86.162*
distortion of financial statements
Q12. Disclose in the audit report
theft of corporate assets by 33 21 18 0 0 47 64.535*
non-managerial
Chi-
Square
Test
Statistics
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Continued from Table 6
Position of the Respondents
Manager, N=72 Auditor, N=47
Yes No Uncertain Yes No Uncertain
Q15. Report privately to a
regulatory authority suspicions 50 18 4 1 11 35 71.304*
of fraud
Q16. Detect illegal acts by
company officials which do not 31 16 25 0 0 47 50.708*
directly affect the company’s
accounts
Q18. Disclose in the audit report
illegal acts which do not directly 14 23 35 1 0 46 31.917*
affect the company’s accounts
Q19. Report privately to a
regulatory authority illegal 23 38 11 1 2 44 70.213*
acts uncovered in the company
Q20.Examine and report on the
fairness of non-financial 32 32 8 0 0 47 90.392*
information
Q22. Examine and report on the
efficiency and effectiveness of 23 36 13 0 1 46 72.514*
the company’s management
Q23. Audit published quarterly 4 42 26 0 2 45 42.052*
company reports
Q24. Examine and report on the 7 25 40 0 1 46 25.443*
fairness of financial forecasts
Q25.Consider and report on the
company’s impact on its local 7 25 40 0 1 46 4.996***
community
Q26. Verify every transaction 1 12 59 0 2 45 22.798*
of the auditee company
* Significant at 1% significance level
**Significance at 5% significance leve1
*** Significant at 10% significance level
Chi-
Square
Test
Statistics
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quence, they are likely to expect the
auditors to perform more than the ac-
tual requirement. Thus, the miscon-
ception is likely to cause an unreason-
able expectation on the duties of the
auditors.
The chi-square analysis in Table
5 indicates significant difference in
knowledge of auditors and corporate
managers on five of the existing duties
of auditors (i.e. Q8, Q13, Q14, Q17
and Q21). Similarly, in Table 6 on
non-existing duties of auditors, except
for duties stated in Q1 and Q25, the
chi-square analysis shows significant
difference in knowledge between the
auditors and corporate managers. An
independent sample t-test was con-
ducted to evaluate the hypothesis on
“knowledge gap.” The t-test in Table 7
[t (117)=22.975, p=0.00] further con-
firms the existence of  the “knowledge
gap.”
Deficient Performance Gap
Analysis
Porter (1993) defines “deficient
performance gap” as the expected stan-
dard of performance of auditors’ exist-
ing duties and auditors’ perceived per-
formance, as expected and perceived
by the public. Based on the Porter’s
model, the “deficient performance gap”
is a component of audit expectation-
performance gap. The information on
deficient performance gap is impor-
tant to the auditing profession as it
reveals the level of satisfaction among
auditees and audit beneficiaries.
The analysis of mean values in
Table 8 on auditors’ performance
shows that most of the auditors rate
their performance above the satisfac-
tory level. This is indicated in the
mean value of more than 3 on all the
existing duties of auditors. However
Table 7. T-Test on “Knowledge Gap”
Group Statistics
Position of the
respondents N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean
index manager 72 62.7137 10.18904 1.20079
auditor 47 27.8232 2.56292 0.37384
Independent Samples Test
t df Sig. Mean Std. Error
(2-tailed) Difference Difference
Equal
index variances 22.975 117 .000 31.88287 1.51863
assumed
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Table 8. The Mean and Standard Deviation Values of Respondents on
Performance on Existing Duties of   Auditors
Position of the Respondents
Manager Auditor Mann-
N=72 N=47Mean Whitney
Test
Mean Std. Mean Std.
Deviation Deviation
Q3. State whether financial statements 4.11 0.797 4.11 0.634 Not
 fairly reflect the company’s affairs  significant
Q6. Express doubts in the audit report
about the company’s continued 3.33 1.006 4.04 0.550 952.500*
existence
Q8.Detect deliberate distortion of 3.02 0.982 3.79 0.75 784.000*
financial information
Q13. Disclose in the audit report mis-
appropriation of company assets by 2.96 1.053 3.91 0.417 597.500*
company directors/senior management
Q14. Disclose in the audit report
deliberate distortion of financial 3.11 1.129 4.07 0.751 686.000*
statements
Q17. Disclose in the audit report
illegal acts which directly affect  2.97 1.062 3.87 0.536 761.500*
the company’s accounts
Q21. Examine the company’s 2.91 0.765 3.73 0.694 333.000*
internal control
* Significant at 1% significance level, **Significance at 5% significance leve1,
*** Significant at 10% significance level
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the smaller mean values (i.e. <3) from
the corporate managers show that the
corporate managers are relatively less
satisfied as compared to the auditors
on the performance of the auditors.
The dissatisfaction is particularly evi-
dent on existing duties stated in Q13,
Q17 and Q21 where the mean value is
less than “3.” The results reveal that
corporate managers find deficiency in
performance of auditors in relation to:
i) disclosing the misappropriation of
company assets which is done by com-
pany directors or senior management,
ii) disclosing the illegal acts encoun-
tered during the audit which directly
affect the company’s accounts in the
audit report, and iii) to examine the
company’s internal control.
The analysis of Mann-Whitney
test in Table 9 shows the difference
between auditors’ and corporate man-
agers’ ratings on the performance of
the auditors on the existing duties re-
quired by MASA and MCA (1965).
The findings show that all existing
duties except for duty stated in Q3, are
rated significantly different between
auditors and corporate managers. Like-
wise, the analysis of t-test in Table 9
shows that the corporate managers
rated the performance of auditors
(mean = 12.50) much lower than those
rated by the auditors themselves (mean
= 64.06). The existence of the “defi-
cient knowledge gap” between the
auditors and corporate managers is
confirmed in the analysis where t (117)
=-10.96, p=0.00. The existence of “de-
ficient knowledge gap” implies that
the Malaysian auditors generally re-
gard the work performed by them at a
higher standard as compared to the
corporate managers.
Table 9. T-Test on “Deficient Performance Gap”
Group Statistics
Position of Std. Std.
the respondents N Mean Deviation Error Mean
Index manager 72 12.5000 24.22261 2.85466
auditor 47 64.0578 26.36475 3.84569
Independent Samples Test
t df Sig. Mean Std. Error
(2-tailed) Difference Difference
index Equal
variances -10.960 117 .000 -51.55775 4.70436
assumed
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Limitation
The study suffers the following
limitations. The number of respon-
dents in this study is limited to only
200 respondents (i.e. 100 auditors and
100 corporate managers) in the area of
Klang Valley. More compelling evi-
dence might have been obtained if the
study manages to use a larger respon-
dent group in the whole of Malaysia.
While the response rate is credible, the
risk of non-response bias remains.
The survey instruments were
based on MASA, MCA (1965) and the
suggested duties of auditors in Porter’s
(1993) study in New Zealand. The
survey instruments were developed and
data was collected before the imple-
mentation of the Anti-Money Laun-
dering Act (2001) (AMLA) in 30 Sep-
tember 2004. The AMLA (2001) re-
quires auditors to report to the Bank
Negara if the auditors suspect or detect
any suspicious transactions or unlaw-
ful activities in the clients’ business.
In view that the research was done
before the AMLA (2001) is enforced;
thus, the duties stated in Q15, Q18,
Q19 are not considered as the existing
duties of auditors for the purpose of
this study. As a result, for a better
reflection of the current situation, an
additional research on the new duties
of auditors is strongly encouraged.
Conclusion
The current study aims to comple-
ment the previous study of audit ex-
pectation gap in Malaysia by investi-
gating whether there is a “knowledge
gap” and “deficient performance gap.”
The investigation of “knowledge gap”
is important in complementing the find-
ing of audit expectation gap in Malay-
sia as the knowledge of the users will
influence the size of the expectation
gap. The “deficient performance gap,”
a component of audit expectation-per-
formance gap (Porter 1993), is exam-
ined because it reveals the level of
satisfaction on work performed by the
auditors. The findings in the study will
be very useful to the auditing profes-
sion as it contributes a new insight into
the audit expectation gap in Malaysia,
which in turn will enable future steps
to be taken in a more comprehensive
and rational basis to narrow the gap.
The results of the study show that
both “knowledge gap” and “deficient
performance gap” exist in Malaysia.
The analysis of “knowledge gap” re-
veals that the Malaysian auditors are
knowledgeable in their duties, although
a small number of auditors are in error
or uncertain in certain duties. In con-
trast, the corporate managers fail to
recognize most of the non-existing du-
ties of auditors. The corporate manag-
ers who are less knowledgeable on the
duties of the auditors are likely to have
misconception about auditing and un-
reasonable expectations of the audi-
tors. Hence, the existence of “knowl-
edge gap” between auditors and cor-
porate managers would in turn provide
a reason for the existence of audit
expectation gap in Malaysia. The
analysis of the “deficient performance
gap” indicates that corporate manag-
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ers find sub-standard performance on
certain duties performed by the audi-
tors. The existence of “deficient per-
formance gap” also implies that the
Malaysian auditors perceive the work
performed by them at a higher stan-
dard as compared to the corporate
managers. The information on “defi-
cient performance gap” will be very
useful to the auditors as it enables
them to improve on the areas that have
been perceived as sub-standard.
The existence of both “knowl-
edge gap” and “deficient performance
gap” are detrimental to the auditing
profession as they will cause unrea-
sonable expectation and dissatisfac-
tion on works performed by the audi-
tors. As such, the auditing profession
and the accounting regulatory authori-
ties in Malaysia should take reason-
able steps to safeguard the value of
auditing and to improve the reputation
of auditors. Educating the users through
better communication would be useful
to correct the misconceptions about
auditing which in turn could reduce
the “knowledge gap” and the “defi-
cient performance gap.”
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